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Long-Term Economic Hardship and
Non-Mainstream Voting in Canada
ANDREA M.L. PERRELLA Université de Montréal
Introduction: Economic Decline and Voter Volatility
Discontent in Canada manifests itself through the emergence of new par-
ties that erode the support of otherwise well-established ones. The plu-
rality electoral system, which heavily favours large and generally centrist
parties, makes such a phenomenon more significant. In Canada, the Lib-
eral and Progressive Conservative parties have traditionally alternated as
government and official opposition. In such a system, success from any
other party is seen as unusual, linked to the rejection of both established
parties, and therefore possibly linked to some serious level of discontent.
But apart from the rare and often short-lived breakthroughs from “third”
parties, Canadians do vote for many other alternatives. When support for
such alternatives increases, one cannot but believe voters are deeply upset
about something, compelling them to turn their backs on “politics as usual.”
Of all the sources of discontent that can direct a voter away from
the two main parties, economic hardship seems the most obvious. Many
other political issues come and go, but economic performance remains a
constant and salient consideration for voters. No other issue touches both
a voter’s need to survive and a voter’s hopes to prosper. This is why eco-
nomic conditions are probably the most studied factor in electoral research,
and why economic voting research offers some of the most robust mod-
els for accurately predicting election outcomes.
Despite its success, however, economic voting research focuses too
narrowly on support levels for incumbents, which for the most part tend
to belong to well-established and mainstream parties. The research relates
such mainstream support to short-term economic conditions, and more
often than not, declines in support for the incumbent tend to correspond
to increased support for another mainstream opposition party. Tradition-
ally in Canada, this support tends to volley between the Liberal and
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~Progressive! Conservative parties, and in the United States, the Repub-
lican and Democratic parties. For the most part, media attention follows
these shifts: are voters supporting the current government or the main
opposition?
Although a short-term approach helps explain why voters like or
dislike an incumbent, it does not adequately explain the strengthening or
weakening support for alternative parties, many of which advance a rad-
ical agenda. This neglect stems largely from the focus on short-term eco-
nomic and political changes, an approach that makes it difficult to study
the basis of electoral support for smaller parties, the support of which
may depend more on structural, longer-term conditions. But a look at
electoral politics in Canada ~and other countries! over the past genera-
tion suggests a need to examine voting behaviour more closely. Many
reasons might explain the emergence of new, and one might argue, rad-
ical, parties since 1993, namely the Reform0Alliance Party, which ~prior
to the merger with the PC Party! focused a great deal of attention on the
need for institutional change in order to elevate the influence of Western
provinces, and the separatist Bloc Québécois, which advocates a differ-
ent sort of constitutional change. Support for these alternative parties
may stem from a deep level of discontent, which might be tied to long-
term economic decline.
Such a question poses a contrast to the concerns of conventional
economic voting research. A recession here and there is not unusual and
should not be expected to lead to the same level of rage as when voters
persistently find themselves struggling economically, even between reces-
sions. That kind of discouraging experience might lead one to question
not only the sitting incumbent; it could also produce more severe evalu-
ations that pin blame on the political structure, seen to be failing in its
delivery of the goods, regardless of who is in power.
In a way, there is nothing new to the notion that voter discontent can
stem from economic hardship. Seymour M. Lipset states, for instance,
that one feature of a stable government system is its ability to sustain a
healthy economy, which upholds the system’s legitimacy: “From Aris-
totle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society
in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could
there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently par-
ticipate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid suc-
cumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues”~195901963: 30!.
Whether or not non-mainstream parties are led by “irresponsible dema-
gogues” is a separate issue, but Lipset’s main point is that voters faced
with serious economic decline tend to abandon the “usual” parties in
favour of something completely new. Furthermore, Lipset notes that this
is especially true among those who experience a great deal of economic
volatility, such as miners, farmers and so forth ~243–244!. He adds that
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discontented people who share a common bond or common communica-
tion channel are more likely to mobilize politically ~262!. This helps
explain why many new political movements tend to succeed first in par-
ticular regions ~e.g., agricultural regions! or among particular segments
of a population ~e.g., unionized workers!.
In Canada, the political implications of economic hardship have been
explained most thoroughly by Maurice Pinard ~1971!, who focused on
how economic strains helped shift Quebec voters away from the Liberals
and Progressive Conservatives and towards Social Credit. He demon-
strated how voters in economically hard-hit regions are more likely to
turn to a third party for solutions, once voters reject the traditional par-
ties for doing too little. Pinard used his findings to validate Neil J.
Smesler’s ~1963! theory of collective behaviour, whereby strains ~such
as economic hardship!, combined with other conditions, such as the ease
with which individuals can mobilize, lead to unrest. Such conditions were
present in rural Quebec, where voters suffering economic strains switched
from one major party to another, eventually giving up on both to support
a new political movement. It should be pointed out that according to
Pinard, it is not poverty per se that triggers discontent, since the poor
are often disengaged from politics ~1971: 149!. But a change from one
economic condition to a worse one can lead to support for a new politi-
cal movement ~1971: 119!, independent of the movement’s ideology.1
A common feature of Lipset’s and Pinard’s perspectives is the atten-
tion paid to voting as not just an expression of approval or disapproval
Abstract. Canadian voting behaviour from 1979 to 2000 is examined by relating long-term
economic changes to support for “non-mainstream” parties, defined as parties other than the
Liberals or Progressive Conservatives. This long-term perspective is unique, in that standard
economic voting research focuses mostly on how short-term economic changes affect support
levels for the incumbent. In order to illustrate the effects of long-term economic decline, fed-
eral voting results are related with short- and long-term economic data, namely unemployment
and labour-force participation rates, all aggregated at the provincial level. The pooled data pro-
duces results that confirm the relevance of short-term changes to explain support for the incum-
bent party, while support for non-mainstream parties is, instead, explained by long-term economic
changes.
Résumé. Cet article examine le comportement électoral des Canadiens de 1979 à 2000 en
reliant les changements économiques à long terme à l’appui accordé aux partis « non dominants »,
à savoir les partis autres que les libéraux et les conservateurs. Cette perspective à long terme
est unique en son genre car les recherches standard sur le vote économique étudient surtout le
retentissement des changements économiques à court terme sur l’appui au parti sortant. Pour
illustrer les effets du déclin économique à long terme, nous avons relié les résultats des élec-
tions fédérales aux données économiques à court et à long terme, notamment les taux de chômage
et de participation de la population active, calculés à l’échelon provincial. Les données agrégées
donnent des résultats qui confirment la pertinence des changements à court terme pour expli-
quer l’appui au parti sortant, tandis que le soutien aux partis « non dominants » s’explique au
contraire par les changements économiques à long terme.
for the governing party, but also as an expression of support for the entire
political system. This is measured by the extent to which economic decline
places voters in an increasingly vulnerable position, and consequently
leads them to question the appropriateness, or legitimacy, of the existing
regime. Legitimacy and stability, curiously, are two central concerns in
political science that contemporary work on economic voting appears to
overlook. Perhaps Canada is not a likely candidate for an all-out legiti-
macy crisis, but the research here will show that Canada also is not
immune to such a development. Long-term economic decline is related
to reduced support for mainstream political parties. Since such a devel-
opment escapes conventional economic voting models, there is a need
to re-conceptualize the link between economic conditions and voting
behaviour.
Conventional economic voting models
A great deal of economic voting research is based on the responsibility
hypothesis, where voters are understood to pass judgment on how well
the government has handled the economy. This has grown to one of the
most prolific areas of voting research, having accumulated a wealth of
literature that includes hundreds of manuscripts ~Lewis-Beck and Pal-
dam, 2000: 113!. This trove of data should come as no surprise, since in
a way it is rather easy to formulate testable hypotheses regarding eco-
nomic conditions and voting behaviour. Models that predict election pros-
pects for the incumbent are also very marketable, since many people
outside the confines of academia, such as news commentators, lobbyists
and political professionals, are interested in predicting election out-
comes, with economic conditions often emerging as a very solid basis
for a reliable political forecast.
General findings are consistent: bad economic times spell trouble
for the party in office. It did not take a generation of research to confirm
what is clearly very intuitive, but it has taken a great deal of work to
identify the precise manner in which economics works. The conceptual-
ization of economics and voting has taken research in a variety of direc-
tions, leading to a varied set of conclusions. The following review shows
how far economic voting has gone to explain the link between economic
conditions and voter behaviour. But as will be seen, there is clearly far
more distance yet to cover, and conventional economic voting has, for
the most part, conducted research with a narrow focus.
Economic voting research confirms what is commonly referred to
as the sociotropic thesis: voters react to national economic conditions
rather than personal, or pocketbook, finances. Personal financial consid-
erations are nowhere near as important as national economic conditions,
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findings that challenge the otherwise clean Downsian model that sees vot-
ers adjust their support for the incumbent according to personal eco-
nomic circumstances ~Downs, 1957!. Egocentric effects do exist, but tend
to be weaker than sociotropic effects ~Lewis-Beck, 1988!. Several rea-
sons are given to explain why national conditions are more influential than
personal economic factors. First, it is not always easy to attribute blame
or credit for changes in personal finances, but it is possible to link gen-
eral economic trends to an administration’s policies. In some societies,
such as the United States ~the setting of most economic voting research!,
an individualistic political culture reduces the political relevance of struc-
tural decisions ~Feldman, 1982, 1985; Sniderman and Brody, 1977!. How-
ever, pocketbook effects gain more prominence when voters can clearly
attribute personal circumstances to the government, a phenomenon par-
ticularly salient in societies with more interventionist governments ~i.e.,
welfare states!, where personal economic conditions are very much tied
to state policies ~Nannestad and Paldam, 1994, 1995, 1997!.
Whereas the sociotropic vs. egocentric debate pertains to the spatial
context of economic voting effects, the retrospective vs. prospective debate
focuses attention on the time dimension. Morris P. Fiorina ~1978! was
among the first to show that voters rely heavily on past economic condi-
tions; since these are more readily known, blame and credit are more eas-
ily established ~Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981!. However, the forward-
looking “bankers” hypothesis offers a formidable counterargument to this
view ~Erikson et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 1992!, which relates trends
in consumer confidence in the United States to support levels for the pres-
ident. Findings substantiate a view of the voter as capable of assessing
future economic expectations and linking those expectations with the cur-
rent governing administration. Other studies find room for both retrospec-
tive and prospective effects. Nadeau and Lewis-Beck ~2001!, for instance,
note that retrospective effects are present if voters are evaluating an incum-
bent, such as a US president seeking a second term, while prospective
effects gain salience when there is no such candidate.
In either case, whether economic conditions are conceptualized as
retrospective or prospective, the time horizon is very short: about 12
months. Furthermore, some see even this period as being too long when
accounting for voter behaviour that appears to correlate more strongly to
economic changes occurring within the past few months ~Nannestad and
Paldam, 1994: 217!. There is a good reason why extending the time hori-
zon too far does not make sense. Much economic voting research is based
on survey data, and respondents are not expected to recall accurately eco-
nomic conditions that took place more than a year or two ago. Further-
more, it is not deemed reasonable to expect respondents to project too
far into the future. As a result, economic voting research is based, for
the most part, on short term effects.
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Although survey-level research restricts the time horizon, the time
horizon of aggregate level work is not much longer. One of the first eco-
nomic voting studies employs aggregate data ~Kramer 1971!, where
declines in aggregate-level income are related to reduced support for
incumbents, conceptualized as US House of Representatives candidates
from the same incumbent presidential party. The findings reveal a pat-
tern that is consistent with the retrospective hypothesis,2 where declines
in economic conditions erode support from the incumbent party. But eco-
nomic change is still measured from the year preceding an election to
the election, a short-term horizon.
Further methodological precision reveals other unique characteris-
tics of various indicators. Take unemployment, for instance. High or low
unemployment rates may be politically important in absolute terms, but
what seems at least equally as important, if not more so, are changes
in the unemployment rate ~Nadeau and Blais, 1993, 1995!. Further-
more, voters seem to react to job growth levels if their expectations are
higher than actually reported by government statistics. Perceptions about
unemployment are driven by personal experience and regional condi-
tions, as well as by partisan cues ~Nadeau et al., 2000!. Others find inter-
active effects between economic and political factors. For instance, the
clientele and “salient goal” hypotheses connect the relative salience of
individual economic indicators to a party’s policy agenda. Here, unemploy-
ment and inflation mean different things to voters as they evaluate dif-
ferent parties. Some parties have a degree of “ownership” over a particular
problem ~see, for example, Carlsen, 2000; Hibbs, 1987; Rattinger, 1991;
Swank, 1993!. A more recent stream of research focuses attention on
regional conditions ~see, for example, Cutler, 2002; Godbout and Bélanger,
2002; Mondak et al., 1996!, where conditions at the provincial, regional
or even neighbourhood level have been measured to mediate sociotropic
evaluations.
Overall, the different approaches to economic-voting research yield
interesting results. But two consistent features throughout the literature
are the short-term horizon and the focus on support levels for the gov-
ernment ~i.e., the incumbent!. What is needed is a look at whether voters
respond to changes that are more structural, and to a more durable set of
economic circumstances spanning a much longer time period. If long-
term economic decline chips away at support for both the incumbent and
the mainstream opposition in favour of non-mainstream parties, then a
short-term horizon might not detect such a shift. Generally, support for
non-mainstream parties is very small, and changes over the short term
are very slight. Hence, a longer-term view is needed to measure some-
thing that otherwise might go unnoticed.
This is not to say that the long-term perspective is completely ignored.
Brooks and Brady ~1999!, for instance, show that a longer-term view
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reveals voting behaviour as reflective of policy evaluations. Here, voters
evaluate party stands on issues such as welfare programs, the size of gov-
ernment, the legitimacy of institutions, and other evaluations that require
more than just 12 months to develop. There is nothing inherently eco-
nomic about this category, given that policies address numerous non-
economic issues. But in many instances, policies affect voters
economically, or are evaluated in light of economic conditions. As an
example, Brooks and Brady mention the New Deal in the United States
as an income redistribution initiative that divided the Republicans and
the Democrats. It is rational, then, for poorer voters to prefer greater redis-
tribution, while wealthier voters tend not to support such a move.
There is some evidence to suggest that a generation of painful eco-
nomic restructuring and long-term economic decline can lead to voter
resentment. Teixeira and Rogers ~2000! point to 1973 as a dividing line
in U.S. economic history, with the pre-1973 period marked by general
affluence, while the post-1973 period was marked by a growing income
gap between the upper and lower classes, a divide that has led to increased
voter resentment. Such a perspective specifies sociotropic0retrospective
evaluations as relevant before 1973, when all hard-working Americans
could expect to become middle class. But the stakes began to change
after 1973, with a widening wage gap making long-term personal eco-
nomic interests more salient among that segment of the voting popula-
tion that was most adversely affected.
In sum, if voters see that no mainstream party appears able—or
willing—to reverse long-term economic decline, then it should come as
no surprise if these same voters blame the system. But such a phe-
nomenon cannot easily be captured by conventional methods that relate
short-term economic changes to opinions about the governing party. A
one-year improvement in economic conditions may certainly yield some
benefit to the incumbent party, but a lengthy period of stagnation might
shift the focus of political discourse to the margins of non-mainstream
political movements.
Conceptualizing voting: mainstream vs. non-mainstream
Economic voting studies that focus only on the level of support for incum-
bent parties cannot adequately measure levels of discontent. Votes for
the opposition Liberals during a Progressive Conservative reign are not
the same as voting for the left-of-centre New Democratic party ~NDP!,
or for the Reform party, the Bloc, the Libertarian party and so forth.
There is a different, and sometimes more aggressive, message commu-
nicated when voters support smaller opposition parties. There are differ-
ent types of such opposition parties, each emerging under a unique context
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~see Gunther and Diamond, 2003 for a more complete and updated dis-
cussion!, but it is sometimes not easy to categorize a particular political
party into any one type.
A common term associated with a non-traditional opposition party
is third party, a concept applied in Canada by Maurice Pinard. Accord-
ing to Pinard, a third party is simply a “non-traditional party which has
not yet been in power” ~1973: 455!. Frustrated voters who do not see a
satisfactory option among the traditional offerings would look for alter-
natives other than the Liberal and PC parties. Both traditional parties
emerged from within Canada’s Parliament, making them essentially insid-
ers, even when one party is in opposition. In contrast, other parties have
extra-parliamentary origins whose challenge to the two traditional par-
ties can only be noticed by contrasting positions. Normally, this involves
an attack of the same institutions that have formed along with the tradi-
tional parties ~Landes, 2002: 364!.
Despite the simplicity of such a definition, the concept of a third party
may be too specific for a study of long-term economic voting. First, few
third parties run candidates in all constituencies and in all provinces. The
Bloc Québécois, for example, only fields candidates in Quebec. Other par-
ties, such as Reform, initially fielded candidates in the Western prov-
inces only, and later expanded to other provinces ~except Quebec! in 1993.
Even then, not all constituencies in the rest of Canada had a Reform can-
didate. Second, even when a third party fields candidates in all prov-
inces, its prominence and campaign strategy may vary from province to
province. For instance, the NDP’s profile in Quebec has always been neg-
ligible. Third, some of the most successful smaller “third” parties in Cana-
dian history have faded into oblivion, making a long-term focus difficult.
The Social Credit party, the Reform party, the Bloc and the NDP all have
captured the attention of those who wish to study voter discontent in Can-
ada. But third parties ~except, perhaps, the NDP! eventually fade away.
Social Credit no longer appears on the Quebec electoral radar; Reform
morphed into the Alliance, which later merged with the PC party; and the
NDP has seen better days. The rise and fall of these parties within a rel-
atively short-to-medium time frame does not easily permit a study of long-
term voting trends. Fourth, the NDP might not qualify as a third party
simply because it is not obvious whether this party is “non-traditional.”
The NDP may take a leftist stance on many issues, and may have had rad-
ical roots, but the party is by no means a novelty in politics, and may sim-
ply be seen as a traditional opposition party ~Gidengil et al., 2001!.
However, the NDP is nonetheless a party with extra-parliamentary ori-
gins, and it remains, at least federally, an outsider.
Even if it were feasible to study a third party over a reasonably long
period of time, the interpretation of votes for such parties would be open
to question. One could argue that the Reform party and the Bloc qualify
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as anti-state parties. An anti-state party pursues fundamental, at times even
constitutional, change to reform the entire political system, not simply to
replace the current executive ~Sartori, 1976!. Communist and fascist par-
ties fall into this category, running candidates in democratic elections just
to acquire power, only to do away with democratic institutions—or imple-
ment drastic reforms—once in power. Although not necessarily as extreme
as communist or fascist parties, the Reform0Alliance party and the Bloc
Québécois could qualify as anti-state. One party was founded to chal-
lenge standard Canadian institutions, such as the unelected Senate, and
the other party was founded to pursue a different sort of fundamental
change, namely Quebec’s independence. On the other hand, one could
argue that neither party intends to uproot democratic institutions or to com-
pletely eliminate the Canadian state; instead, both hope to rearrange and
rebalance the country’s institutions to reflect regional concerns.
New parties such as the Reform0Alliance party could also qualify
as an “anti-party” movement. Such movements are based on negative per-
ceptions of established parties, which lead them to conclude that parties
are no longer able to represent the electorate ~Poguntke, 1996!. Declin-
ing turnout, dealignment and the rise of support for the Reform0Alliance
party all coincide with an increased sense of voter discontent towards
Canada’s two main political parties, the Liberal and Progressive Conser-
vative Parties ~see, for example, Bélanger, 2004; Clarke and Kornberg,
1993, 1996; Clarke et al., 2000; Gidengil et al., 2001!.3 But again, the
Reform0Alliance party does not field candidates simply to oust the
insiders; instead, it has evolved to behave less and less as a Western pro-
test party and has increasingly taken on the role of a party with an eye
on government, especially following its merger with the Progressive
Conservatives.
While it is not always obvious whether a larger third party reflects
either anti-state or anti-party elements, with the smaller parties such dis-
tinctions are even less clear. What should one conclude regarding the
Green party, the Christian Heritage party or “fringe” parties ~such as the
Rhinoceros party! that at times appear to parody the political system? To
some extent, such smaller parties reflect both anti-state and anti-party
sentiments. The more religious movements might derive support from
those who regard mainstream political parties as too decadent, especially
in light of hot-button issues such as abortion and homosexual rights. More
policy-oriented movements might reflect an anti-system perspective, with
the Greens deriving some support from ecocentric voters.
Given all these particular difficulties with the concept of a third party,
a more general understanding is needed. The term “non-mainstream” party
seems to conjure the same type of characteristics normally ascribed to
third parties: an alternative choice. But “non-mainstream” is a more gen-
eral concept, and non-mainstream voting can be defined as simply the
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aggregate of votes cast for such alternatives. ~See the appendix for a com-
plete list of all non-mainstream parties that ran candidates during the
period of this study.! Size does not matter, because non-mainstream par-
ties could range in size from larger movements that have formed the offi-
cial opposition, such as the Reform0Alliance party and the Bloc
Québécois, to smaller parties and less prominent candidates that hardly
ever get mentioned, such as independents, the Marxist-Leninists, the
Green party, the Libertarians, the Natural Law party, and so forth. All
non-mainstream parties are unique in what they stand for and how they
attract voters, but one could argue that the common feature among all
non-mainstream parties is that a vote for such parties is clearly not a
vote for politics as usual. A vote for a non-mainstream party is a rejec-
tion of mainstream politics.
When viewed as a whole, it is clear that Canadians vote in suffi-
ciently high numbers against the two mainstream parties, the Liberal and
~Progressive! Conservative parties. Prior to the watershed 1993 election,
the proportion of votes cast for non-mainstream parties hovered within a
range of 20 to 25 per cent ~see Figure 1!, due mainly—but not exclu-
sively—to support for the NDP. Since 1993, support for the non-
mainstream parties surged past 40 per cent, due mostly—but again, not
exclusively—to the emergence of the Reform0Alliance party and the Bloc
Québécois. In other words, while support for particular non-mainstream
parties is volatile over time, support overall for all non-mainstream par-
ties tends to be more steady, and support levels tend to reflect a gener-
alized expression for an alternative voice, sometimes based on rage,
sometimes on ideology, but generally based on a rejection of mainstream
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Data and Methods
In order to link economic conditions to support for non-mainstream par-
ties, the study compiled provincial economic data and provincially pooled
federal voting data. Canada’s ten provinces offer neat packages of both
economic data and voting results, permitting the construction of ten data
points for every election being studied. Election results from previous
elections are conveniently and freely available from Canada’s Library of
Parliament Web site. Ballots cast for every candidate, whether affiliated
to a party or not, are contained in these databases. The study uses aggre-
gated provincial-level election results to construct two separate vari-
ables. One variable tracks the proportion of votes cast for non-mainstream
parties, while another variable tracks the percentage of votes cast for
the incumbent party. The Liberal party was the incumbent for the 1979,
1984, 1997 and 2000 elections, while the PC party was the incumbent
for the 1980, 1988 and 1993 elections. For the seven elections covered,
more than 87 million valid votes were cast, the vast proportion of which
went to Canada’s two mainstream parties, the Liberals and Progressive
Conservatives.
To complement the voting data, the study gathered provincial-level
economic data from 1969 to 2000 from Statistics Canada’s Labour Force
Survey databases ~CANSIM table 282-0002!, producing a pooled ag-
gregate dataset of 69 data points.4 Two key economic indicators were
extracted: unemployment rate and labour-force participation rate. The
unemployment rate requires little justification, given that it is a valid and
widely used measure of economic conditions. The other labour-market
indicator, the participation rate, appears to have never before been used
in voting research. Economic research, especially labour economics, does
pay a great deal of attention to participation rates, a measure that reveals
economic conditions which are not accurately captured by the unemploy-
ment rate.
First, labour-force participation is affected by longer-term condi-
tions, such as demographics. Immigration, the baby-boom generation and
the entry of women into the workforce all affect the supply side of the
workforce. Data from Statistics Canada reflect some of these demo-
graphic changes. For instance, the male-to-female ratio of the labour force
declined from .30 in 1976 to .23 in 2000.5 Second, labour-force partici-
pation may reflect overall economic health. Economic expansion, such
as the period following the Second World War up to the 1960s, drew
more people into the workforce, while trends from the 1960s to the 1980s
show the reverse. Economic shocks ~e.g., OPEC!, stagflation, downsiz-
ing and the outsourcing of manufacturing and industrial work to the devel-
oping world all contribute to overall economic malaise that affects the
“demand” side for labour. Industry automation can permanently elimi-
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nate the need for certain workers, rendering them economically obsolete,
with the consequence of seeing larger segments of the population—
especially those who lack a post-secondary education—disqualified from
many of the growth areas of the economy, or qualified only for work that
does not pay as much as the blue-collar union wages of a previous gen-
eration. Such conditions appear to have negatively affected labour-force
participation ~Holzer, 1990!, which may explain the post-1980s slowing
trend of the participation rate, shown in Figure 2.
If it persists, an extended period of economic decline discourages
workers, who simply give up looking for work, while potential workers,
such as students who have recently graduated, do not even bother to look
~Sapsford, 1981!. This might lead to unemployment, but it might also
lead to a different type of employment, such as part-time work. Accord-
ing to Statistics Canada, the ratio of part-time to full-time workers grew
from .14 in 1976 to .22 in 2000.6
All of these factors contribute to overall earning potential, which is
another key factor that drives participation rates ~Parsons, 1980!. Declin-
ing income prospects discourage potential workers from seeking employ-
ment. This degree of economic malaise is not always adequately captured
by simply relying on unemployment figures. Participation rates thus offer
a more comprehensive indicator.
Another good reason to use the participation rate is its ability to tap
into long-term economic trends. Short-term decline, including the occa-
sional recession, may have some impact on participation rates, but the
impact seems more pronounced on unemployment, which tends to bounce
back more quickly. Participation rates, on the other hand, increase or
decrease independently of the business cycle. This suggests that the deci-
FIGURE 2
Labour Market Trends in Canada, 1969–2000
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sion to join or withdraw from the labour force depends on long-term fac-
tors rather than short-term economic swings ~Ostry and Zaidi, 1979!. In
other words, the labour-force participation rate functions as a general indi-
cator of overall economic strength.
For each main indicator—unemployment and participation—two dif-
ferent types of variables are created, one for short-term changes and one
that covers the long term. Short-term changes are simply an arithmetic
subtraction of election-year rates less the rates in the preceding year. Long-
term changes are calculated in a similar fashion, based on current year
rates minus the rates 10 years prior.
Canada’s political landscape cannot be fully understood without tak-
ing into account regional considerations ~Gidengil et al., 1999!, hence
the decision to include regional dummies. Furthermore, since the dataset
is comprised of provincially pooled data, and given that regression analy-
sis is being used to test the hypotheses, regional dummies are necessary
to account for the possibility that residuals might not be independent
across the regions. Three such regional dummies are constructed: one
for the Western provinces; another for Quebec; and one for the Atlantic
provinces.7 Ontario was the excluded region and thereby functions as the
reference group.
The four economic variables ~short- and long-term versions of
unemployment and participation! and the three regional dummy vari-
ables form the basis of Ordinary Least Squares ~OLS! regression models
to test two different hypotheses. The first hypothesis tests the responsi-
bility thesis. Confirmation of this hypothesis would be substantiated if
short-term economic conditions explain support levels for the incum-
bent party. Of the two economic variables, a short-term change in the
unemployment rate would be expected to yield the most significant results
in explaining incumbency votes.
H1: Support for the incumbent is inversely related to short-term changes
in unemployment.
The participation rate is not expected to yield significant results; neither
are the long-term versions of either economic variable.
The second hypothesis tests the link between long-term economic
decline and support for non-mainstream parties.
H2: Support for non-mainstream parties is inversely related to long-
term changes in the labour participation rate.
The short-term version of the participation rate and both versions of the
unemployment variable are expected to yield insignificant findings.
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Results
The economic variables and regional dummies were used to produce
regression models, summarized in Table 1. Overall, the models appear
stable, showing no major violation of any assumption to a linear regres-
sion model.8 The first model confirms the responsibility thesis, but with
mixed results. Overall, support for an incumbent could be explained by
short-term changes to unemployment, as hypothesized. However, short-
term changes to the participation rate also yield a marginally significant
result ~p , .10!, suggesting that it, too, should be included in the model.
Models 2a and 2b confirm the second hypothesis. Model 2a clearly
shows that the only significant economic variable that explains support
TABLE 1
Comparing Long- and Short-Term Effects
1 2a 2b
Dependent variable, vote share (percentage) for: Incumbent Non-mainstream parties*
Regional dummies:
West 2.0875* .250c .254c
~.040! ~.070! ~.067!
Quebec .0194 .0862 .0881
~.064! ~.111! ~.109!
Atlantic .000851 2.178b 2.185c
~.039! ~.068! ~.067!
Economic conditions, long-term:
Participation rate .233 22.783c 22.931c
~.455! ~.788! ~.637!
Unemployment rate .367 .148
~.576! ~.998!
Economic conditions, short-term:
Participation rate 4.675a 1.215 1.748
~2.651! ~4.592! ~4.534!
Unemployment rate 23.831b 1.343 1.707
~1.576! ~2.73! ~2.606!
Intercept .324c 2.506c 2.508c
~.038! ~.066! ~.065!
R-sq .309 .626 .635
Adj. R-sq .229 .584 .601
SEE .105 .182 .181
N 69 69 70
*The dependent variable ~proportion vote for non-mainstream parties! was converted to a base-10




Significant coefficients in bold face; standard error in parentheses.
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for non-mainstream voting is the long-term change in participation rates.
None of the short-term variables yields significant scores, and neither
does the long-term change in unemployment. ~Model 2b excludes long-
term unemployment for reasons explained below.! The second hypoth-
esis is further confirmed visually through regional-level scatterplots ~see
Figures 3a to 3c!. All three major regional groupings show a consistent
FIGURE 3A
Participation Rate and Non-Mainstream Vote, Western Provinces
FIGURE 3B
Participation Rate and Non-Mainstream Vote, Central Canada
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pattern: weaker growth in labour-force participation is related to stronger
support for non-mainstream parties.
In a sense, these results simply suggest that long-term economic
decline does not bode well for mainstream parties. This interpretation
follows the conceptualization of labour-force participation as strictly eco-
nomic. However, the participation rate could also be interpreted as a
measurement of overall integration into mainstream society. Drops in
labour-force participation reflect worsening long-term socioeconomic con-
ditions. In such a context, a decline in the participation rate captures a
very real sense of economic hardship, and might also reflect “social exclu-
sion” ~Brady, 2003: 723!. The decision to stop looking for work is a reac-
tion to bad economic conditions, alienation and an overall sense of
exclusion, sentiments normally exploited by non-mainstream parties.
However, as already pointed out in reference to Pinard’s work, the
socially excluded tend to be non-voters. Hence, there is nothing in these
findings that suggests that the inverse relationship between labour-force
participation and support for non-mainstream parties derives from voters
who have withdrawn from the workforce. Instead, it may be those work-
ers who are left behind to do all the work who feel resentment. In addi-
tion, they may not necessarily express their resentment by pointing to
economic conditions. As Ruy A. Teixeira and Joel Rogers ~2000! indi-
cate, rising discontent among working-class American voters stems from
a sense of unfairness. The large segment of voters who work, pay taxes
and struggle to make ends meet perceive a political establishment more
intent on addressing the needs of minorities, welfare recipients, as well
FIGURE 3C
Participation Rate and Non-Mainstream Vote, Atlantic Provinces
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as citizens who do not work, and who probably do not vote, either. But
working-class citizens do vote in greater proportions, and the political
relevance of their sense of unfairness grows amid worsening economic
conditions over a long period of time. It would then come as no surprise
to see such voters gravitate increasingly towards political parties that advo-
cate a social and political agenda wrapped in the language of worker
rights, taxpayer rights and government waste. The political behaviour itself
may be non-economic, but the drive for such a movement may very well
stem from economic strains.
The other main economic indicator, unemployment, did not pro-
duce nearly as consistent a picture. Long-term increases in the unemploy-
ment rate are not accompanied by increased support for non-mainstream
parties, mostly because of the cyclical pattern of unemployment. It is
clearly subject to more volatility than the steadier pattern of participa-
tion rates ~see Figure 2!. Therefore, a 10-year change in unemployment
rates might not accurately capture a trend. It is precisely for this reason
that two different long-term models were constructed: one that included
long-term changes to unemployment, and one without unemployment.
Results for both versions do not differ by much, but it might make more
theoretical sense to exclude unemployment, at least in the way it is used
in these models.
Among the regional variables, the Western regional dummy is con-
sistently significant for both models. The Western dummy is negative in
Model 1, which suggests lower levels of support for the government within
Western provinces, the flipside to the positive coefficient score in Mod-
els 2a and 2b. This is not overly surprising, given that non-mainstream
parties have often flared up in the West. The Progressives, Social Credit,
the New Democrats, Conservatives and, more recently, the Reform0
Alliance have traditionally drawn a lot of support from the West. West-
ern alienation is a sentiment that clearly has contributed to the success
of non-mainstream parties in that region. But would not economic decline
further inflame a region with a political context already predisposed to
view conventional Canadian politics as biased in favour of the centre? In
other words, economic decline in other parts of Canada might be inter-
preted as either bad economic decisions by state leaders or simply an
ebb in the economic cycle, while in the West it might be seen as a rip-
off. Lipset ~195901963! and Pinard ~1971! both mention this possibility,
and the data appear to validate them. This may explain why the scatter-
plot for the Western provinces ~Figure 3a! shows a stronger inverse rela-
tionship between labour-force participation and support for non-
mainstream parties than the scatterplots for the other two regions: the
West may be the region that is most sensitive to economic changes and,
consequently, more prone to transfer economic discontent to support for
a non-mainstream party.
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As for the other two regional dummies, one or both of the remain-
ing regions fail to attain significance. Quebec never yields a significant
result, probably due to the small sample size that accounts for this regional
dummy. The Atlantic regional dummy is significant only for the model
that explains votes for non-mainstream parties, and curiously, living in
what is clearly Canada’s poorest region removes vote share from non-
mainstream parties. One explanation for this finding is that the context
in the Atlantic provinces might be totally opposite to that of the West,
whereby voters in the Maritimes are more likely to sustain their support
for mainstream parties. Again, this validates Pinard and Lipset, where
poverty ~and the Atlantic provinces are persistently the poorest in Can-
ada! does not automatically cause people to revolt. Nonetheless, even in
the poorest region we see a significant inverse relationship between labour-
force participation and support for non-mainstream parties.
Conclusion
The results presented here lead us to draw several conclusions. First, the
responsibility thesis is easily replicated, where support levels for the
incumbent party could reasonably be tied to short-term economic changes.
In particular, a drop ~increase! in the unemployment rate over a period of
one year bolsters ~hurts! voter support for the incumbent party. But it is
one thing for voters to “kick out the rascals” and place in government
another mainstream party, and quite another when voters increasingly pre-
fer parties with more radical agendas. This leads to the second main con-
clusion: long-term economic decline appears linked to the support for
non-mainstream parties. If an increase in voter support for non-mainstream
parties is understood to mean a vote against the status quo as well as a
vote in favour of a set of ideas that pursues fundamental changes, then
the findings reported here support Lipset’s theory ~195901963!, which
relates governmental legitimacy to generalized affluence.
Such results could not have been generated by relying on conven-
tional economic voting techniques, which focus on the short term. The
short-term analysis cannot easily detect any growing disconnect between
voters and mainstream politics, an evolutionary process that takes a con-
siderable amount of time. If voter shifts are presumed to move at glacial
speeds, then short-term economic indicators can only tap into changes in
support for the incumbent party. This is another important conclusion that
can be drawn from this article’s analytical approach: long-term changes
to economic conditions matter at least as much as short-term ones.
But since the results presented here are based on a compilation of
provincially pooled data, theoretical validation requires analysis with
individual-level data. Election surveys and other micro-level data might
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form a basis upon which to construct further studies of this type, assum-
ing appropriate data exist.
Furthermore, the conclusion that long-term economic decline
increases support for non-mainstream parties may be a phenomenon
unique to plurality systems. The same conceptualization of voting behav-
iour may not yield the same results in proportional representation ~PR!
systems. In PR systems, as clearly stated by Maurice Duverger ~1954!,
voters who wish to support smaller parties do not necessarily feel their
votes would be “wasted.” Consequently, voters cast ballots for parties
that appeal to specific political agendas, an effect that in turn encour-
ages the proliferation of more parties. Hence, PR systems are more likely
than plurality systems to encourage voter support for radical, separatist,
regional, single-issue, extremist or other non-mainstream political par-
ties, regardless of economic contexts. But in a plurality system, it takes a
great deal of strife ~such as long-term economic decline! to encourage
voters to move away from the traditional choices and to take a chance on
a non-mainstream party. Also, as Pinard ~1971! notes, voters suffering
strain shift their support to a third party when the main opposition party
is weak in their constituency. In Canada’s case, the weakness of the Pro-
gressive Conservatives in rural Quebec led frustrated Liberal supporters
to vote for the rising Social Credit. Third parties in such a context can
succeed locally or regionally but not nationally. But voters in a PR sys-
tem do not require the context of one-party dominance to feel inclined to
support a non-mainstream party, since under this system a vote cast for a
smaller party would not necessarily be wasted. Such an institutional con-
text limits Pinard’s approach, and also limits the extent to which the results
from this article could be generalized to different electoral systems.
In addition, PR systems further complicate matters through their pro-
pensity to form coalition governments. Such partnerships may make it
difficult to separate mainstream from non-mainstream parties. Take Den-
mark and Austria as examples. Denmark’s 2001 election produced a coali-
tion of two parties that may be considered mainstream, the Liberals and
the Conservatives. But Denmark’s coalition also relies on an opposition
party, the far-right Danish People’s party, to govern with a majority. Aus-
tria, too, experimented with a coalition involving a far-right party, the
Freedom party. Should such non-traditional and otherwise unconven-
tional parties be considered mainstream once they are admitted into a
governing coalition, even if such parties advance an ambitious and argu-
ably non-mainstream agenda?
Multi-partyism and institutional contexts that favour coalition gov-
ernments make the mainstream0non-mainstream conceptualization of vot-
ing behaviour difficult to apply. More precision may be required to relate
long-term economic decline to increased support for whatever qualifies
as “non-mainstream” in such contexts. Lately, that behaviour appears tied
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to the recent success of nationalist and far-right parties that challenge
the status quo. It would be valuable to assess the link between growing
support for such parties in other industrialized economies and the con-
siderable economic restructuring that has taken place over the past gen-
eration. Neo-conservative challenges to the welfare state, OPEC oil shocks
and the shift of manufacturing jobs to developing countries may have all
led to more challenging economic conditions for voters. If the Canadian
case is not unique, then long-term economic change and economic decline
in other countries may shed light on the growth of other political move-
ments that challenge mainstream politics.
Notes
1 Pinard ~1971! notes that the success of a new political movement is not as dependent
on its ideology, given that discontented voters who are ready for an alternative would
tend simply to support whichever party “appears to them most likely to be success-
ful, whether it is conservative or progressive in the eyes of the sophisticated observer”
~95!; in the case of Quebec, it was the Social Credit party.
2 Kramer ~1983! points out that aggregate-level data does not confirm or negate an
egocentric link. Voting behaviour related to aggregate economic data cannot explain
whether voters respond to changes to their own personal incomes, or to changes in
national-level incomes.
3 It should be noted that Poguntke ~1996! distinguishes between specific and general-
ized anti-partyism. The first explains voter discontent with overall performance of
governing or other key parties, while the latter points to voter discontent with the
whole concept of a political party. Bélanger ~2004! and Gidengil et al. ~2001! show
that sometimes a party can tap into both sentiments, as in the case of the Reform
Party of Canada, which appealed to those who were upset with both the Liberals and
the Conservatives, as well as those who otherwise felt disengaged from party politics
altogether.
4 The total number of data points would have been 70, but unemployment data for
Prince Edward Island was missing for some years during the early 1970s, reducing
the sample size to 69 for two of the three models tested.
5 CANSIM table 282-0002.
6 CANSIM table 282-0002.
7 Western provinces include British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.
Atlantic provinces include Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick.
8 Collinearity diagnostics suggest no problem with respect to the relationship between
the different independent variables. Residual analysis also does not suggest any other
serious problems, except for models 2a and 2b, where heteroscedasticity was detected.
This was treated using a base-10 logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable.
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Appendix: Non-Mainstream Parties That Ran Candidates
in Canadian Elections from 1979 to 2000





Christian Heritage party of Canada
Communist party of Canada
Confederation of Regions Western party
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
Green party of Canada
Independent, or candidates with no party affiliation
Libertarian party of Canada
Marijuana party
Marxist-Leninist party
National party of Canada
Natural Law party of Canada
New Democratic party
Parti Nationaliste du Québec
Parti Rhinocéros
Party for the Commonwealth of Canada
Reform party of Canada
Social Credit
Union Populaire
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